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Introduction
The increase in pollution emission challenges researchers to assess its causes, which frequently have an economic origin. Trade, growth, foreign direct investment, among other economic factors, affect the environment. Economists analyzed each of these different factors individually. Less attention (if any) is given to Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions (henceforth M&As). There are at least two reasons to consider these flows separately. First, it constitutes the biggest share of total FDI (Brakman et al., 2008) and is the main driving force of the recent increase in foreign direct investment (Unctad, 2006) . Second, the effect of M&As and Greenfield Investments on the environment is not necessarily the same. Greenfield investments involve the construction of new production facilities, making the implementation of more up-todate (and perhaps cleaner) technologies easier. M&As, on the other hand, may involve the extensive use of current technology and production facilities. But it can also imply the adoption of cleaner techniques from the acquiring firm.
To uncover the effect that M&As can have on pollution emissions, we need to consider a possible asymmetry with respect to the development level of both target and acquirer countries. Developed countries are associated with higher environmental standards, which influences the technology adopted by firms. Also, a disaggregation of the data regarding the target sector is necessary. Sectors that pollute more are expected to have a more substantial impact on the environment than sectors that do not pollute. Analyzing all sectors together may jeopardize the significance of the results.
Carbon Dioxide is the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas. The biggest concern with the increase of CO 2 emissions is global warming. Because of its global effect the solution rests upon the collaboration among countries. Therefore, in the past years many countries committed themselves to multilateral agreements to decrease and control the degradation of the environment. The participation in these agreements is another factor that determines CO 2 emissions, and should be controlled for to examine the impact of M&As on the environment.
The trade-off between environmental preservation and economic growth is nondeniable. But, even this common-sense relation can be the origin of long debates. If we consider only emissions of Carbon Dioxide we find that economic growth has a different impact on the amount of emissions, depending on the development level of the countries. By separating the countries in High income and Low or Middle income (World Bank historical classification), Figure 1 shows that for different group of years, there is (if any) a negative relation between CO 2 emissions given the GDP for high income countries, but a positive relation for low and medium income countries. There are at least two distinct explanations for the negative relation between CO 2 emissions and GDP for high income countries. First, the use of cleaner technologies by more developed countries. Second, developed countries are relocating dirty industries towards developing countries (either through trade or FDI).
Among the current research, a main topic is whether a closed economy (both in terms of trade and FDI) is preferred from an environmental point of view. Our objective in this paper is to focus on the impact of M&As on Carbon Dioxide emissions. If it affects the environment, then which direction prevails: do acquirer firms bring cleaner technology to their target firms, or do they take advantage of weaker pollution policy in the target country to use (perhaps) cheaper and dirtier technology?
Most of the related papers (discussed in section 2) have explored the interconnection between FDI and the environment, but no consensus has so far been reached. We take this literature in consideration, as well as the literature on the impact of trade on the environment. Our main contribution is threefold. First, we make a sectoral disaggregation of the M&As, second, we separate both target and acquirer countries with respect to their income classification (World Bank 1 ), and finally we consider the impact of a multilateral institutional variable.
We test three hypotheses. In regard the income classification of the countries, we explore a possible asymmetric relationship. Considering that, in general, developed countries face stricter environmental policy; it is expected that multinationals from developed countries adopt cleaner technologies than the ones from developing countries. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Asymmetry
M&As from a high income country (acquiring country) reduce CO 2 emissions.
For the disaggregation of the data in sectors, we analyze whether all sectors have an impact on CO 2 emissions, or only a few of them. We separate the data on M&As in four sectors (see section 2 and appendix A for details) to test our second hypothesis: Finally, since CO 2 emission is a global problem (in the sense that the emission of every country will have an impact on the world as a whole) multilateral agreement is the most effective way to persuade countries to decrease their emission level. Therefore, we propose an institutional index, which varies from 0 to 10, where 0 means that a country does not participate 3 in any of the major multilateral agreements, and 10 if it participates in all of them (see section 2 and appendix B for details). This gives rise to our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Multilateralism
Multilateral agreements are an important instrument to decrease CO 2 emissions.
To test these three hypotheses, we consider a panel of more than 100 target countries, in the period 1988-2004. Our model specification considers both the theoretical and empirical literature in the field. Therefore, the next section of this paper gives an overview of the literature, and the motivation of our hypotheses. In Section 3 we present the empirical model specification. Section 4 describes the data base and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 covers the estimation results and robustness checks, and finally Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical framework and motivation 2a Motivation and contribution
Recent theory on M&As (Neary, 2007) shows that acquirers are the most efficient firms among its competitors. This result has further been supported by the empirical literature (Brakman et al., 2008) . Additionally, they pursue more innovation activities as compared to uni-national firms (Dunning, 1996; Cantwell and Janne, 1999; Gerybadze and Reger, 1999; Johansson and Loof, 2006) . This suggests that multinationals have a capacity to improve, which makes them more likely to undergo innovative ways to reduce costs (by reducing waste, for example), and to create higher quality and cleaner products and process.
Porter and van der Linde (1995) show that innovation can lead to a decrease in pollution and a simultaneous increase in competitiveness, which they name as a win-win situation. The authors describe case examples of different ways through which companies can increase competitiveness by becoming more environment-friendly. This can be achieved because high emissions are frequently the result of inefficient use of the resources, which leads to extra handling, storage and disposal activities. By eliminating costly materials, reducing disposal costs for the user, making better use of materials in the process, and recycling, for example the firm will achieve the win-win situation.
Nonetheless, as the argument from Porter and van der Linde (1995) goes, it is the environmental standards faced by the companies that will trigger innovation in cleaner product or processes. The authors refer to stricter environmental standards as "innovation offsets" because it stimulates innovation that reduces pollution emissions.
Therefore, when firms are exposed to a stricter environmental regulation, they will have an incentive to search for ways to reduce their pollution emissions. Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar materials; Leather and leather products Note: a) Pollution intensity is defined as the ratio of kilograms of Carbon Monoxide Emission over the value of output, from the Industrial Pollution Projection System (Hettige et al., 1995) . b) Representative sectors in groups P, and Z are based on 2 digit code classification. They are listed as representative because many of the 4 digit SIC code under them belong to one of these groups. For the exact disaggregation, see Appendix A.
To the best of our knowledge, the sectoral distinction in M&As has not yet been analyzed empirically to measure the impact on air pollution. Nevertheless, such a study would contribute in disentangling which target sectors of M&As have an impact on the environment. We disaggregate manufacturing sectors in pollution intensive, and zero pollution intensive, along with agriculture and mining; and services and construction (Table 1 above presents a few representative sectors that fall under these categories,
while Appendix A provides the complete disaggregation).
The above disaggregation of the sectors allows us to analyze the possibility of spill-over effects. If we find a negative impact of M&As in sectors not intensive in pollution in CO 2 emission, then we would have an indication for a spill-over effect, a fact present in the literature (see Albornoz et al., 2009 for a recent paper on this matter). That is, when an M&A occur in a target sector which is zero pollution intensive, this firm may demand their suppliers to provide a clean product or process. In this way, even firms that do not pollute would have a positive impact on the environment. 1992 The convention ultimate objective is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
The motivation for the Multilateralism hypothesis is the global nature of the problem imposed by high CO 2 emissions. To take that into account we propose an institutional index. It involves the number, out of 10 major multilateral agreements, that the target country has signed and ratified. To construct this index we counted the number of agreements that a particular country participated in each year, from 1988 until 2004 (see Appendix B for details). Table 2 gives an overall description of these agreements. The agreements are considered as the 10 major environmental multilateral agreements by the Earth Trends, World Resources Institute.
We expect that countries participating in a higher number of multilateral agreements to be more active in implementing measures that decrease environmental degradation. This is particularly important for CO 2 emissions, since what matters is the total emission by all countries.
2b
Theoretical framework
To the best of our knowledge there are no papers that try to assess the impact of M&As on the environment, but a few analyze it for Foreign Direct Investment as a whole 4 . Jorgenson (2007a) investigates the impact of FDI dependence (FDI over GDP) in the manufacturing sector on CO 2 and organic water pollutants emissions in less developed countries. Using panel regression analyses covering the period 1975-2000, the author"s finding indicates that FDI dependence in manufacturing has a positive impact in CO 2 (and water pollutants) emission in less developed countries. Bao et al. (2008) adopt a quadratic relation to measure the impact of FDI in pollution emission 5 in China. Their argument is that initially, multinationals have a "scale" effect in the target country, which leads to a rise in pollution. As the number of multinationals increases in this target country, the demand for stricter environmental regulation goes up. This pushes multinationals to adopt cleaner technologies, with spill-overs to domestic firms as well. Based on data from 29 provinces in the period 1992-2004, the authors find support for an inverted-U curve relationship between FDI and pollution emission. Thus, initially, multinationals would have a negative impact on the environment, and after a threshold has been reached, the impact would be positive. 4 Most of the papers that explore the link between the environment and FDI focus on the pollution-haven hypothesis, that is, they measure the impact of environmental regulation on the attraction of FDI (Eskeland and Harrison, 1997; Wheeler, 2001; Smarzynska and Wei, 2001) . 5 The authors use five different indicators of pollution emission: industrial polluted water emissions; chemical oxygen demand in industrial water pollution; sulfur dioxide emissions; industrial smoke emissions and industrial solid wastes. Liang (2006) also estimates the impact of FDI on pollution emission in China, but using as an indicator for the pollutant, sulfur dioxide. The author considers more than 260
cities from 1996 to 2003 and estimates the model using an instrumental variable approach. The results generally show that more FDI decreases SO 2 emissions.
Jorgenson (2007) tests whether FDI as a proportion of total GDP in the primary sector increases CO 2 emissions from agriculture production in less developed countries. The motivation is based on the hypothesis that foreign firms in the agriculture sector use more chemicals and machinery in order to increase productivity. His results, using data from 1980 and 1999, indicate that FDI dependence in agriculture increases CO 2 emissions in developing countries. Antweiler et al. (2001) , while paying more attention to the impact of trade on the environment, have also considered the role of FDI. The authors use the ratio of inward stock of FDI to the overall capital stock and in addition interact this variable with a categorical variable of GDP per capita. In general they find that the link between FDI intensity and pollution level is positive but small.
Furthermore, the papers that deal with the impact of trade on the environment also bring important insight to our research question. More importantly, we believe that the literature on FDI and trade should not be separated. If there is an indication that both factors can affect pollution emission, than they should be included together in any empirical model that tries to understand the determinants of pollution emission. For this reason, we will also control for trade variables in our empirical model specification.
From a theoretical point of view, the "pollution havens" models of international trade are the reference of supporters of the idea that poorer countries are harmed with trade because of their weaker environmental regulation. However, these models base on the assumption that environmental regulation is an essential production cost. Once factor endowment is also considered, the results may actually reverse. Poorer countries may specialize in cleaner goods if they have a relative abundance in factors used intensively in the production of clean goods.
Therefore, the impact of trade on the environment is not so obvious. Briefly stating, two mechanisms will determine the overall result: relative factor endowment abundance and environmental regulation. To measure the impact of trade on the environment, we need to take both mechanisms into account. What is more commonly done in the empirical literature is to measure the impact of trade openness on pollution. Second, the sector that we would be more concerned with, "Pollution Intensive" is the second most important target of M&As, representing 32.2% of the deals in the period.
Finally, regarding the problem of missing values, although this frequency is high, there
is not much difference with respect to the sectors. The sector with the least missing values of the deal is "Agriculture and Mining" (41.6%) and the one with the most missing values is "Pollution Intensive" (57.4%). Table 3 shows the sectoral distribution of M&As in terms of number of M&As.
Nevertheless, for our purpose, the value of the transactions is a better indication of the "size" of this investment for the target country, and will be our primary control variable for M&As. Therefore, in table 4 we show summary statistics for the value of the deal, disaggregated by sectors. Again, "Construction and Services" received the majority of M&As (58%), followed by "Pollution intensive" (30%). Additionally, also in terms of values, sector "Pollution intensive" embodies a significant part of all M&As.
Comparing the percentage from total, in terms of number (third column from Table 3) and values (last column from Table 4 ), we find that, for all sectors, there is no substantial difference. Additionally, this fraction is considerably smaller, when developing countries are one of the players.
Finally, since our primary variable will be the value of M&As, it is important to check whether there are some data characteristics with more missing values then the others.
We already showed that this was not the case for the target sectors of the deals.
Additionally, we check the percentage of missing data for the 18 years considered in our analysis. The only concern we have by using the value of M&As, as our control variable of M&As, is that there are some important players, both as target and acquirers, that have a large amount of missing data for the value of transactions. 7 On the other hand, the correlation between the value of the transaction (or number) and the percentage of missing data by country (both for target or acquirer) is very close to zero. In other words, it is not the case that more active countries in M&As have more complete data, nor the other way around.
3b
Additional control variables
From the empirical literature, common control variables are: GDP, urban population, GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared. The inclusion of the first two variables is straightforward. The higher the GDP, the higher the demand for goods and services, and therefore more pollution is expected. In regard urbanization, many "dirty" activities (e.g. transport, production) take place in urban regions, causing higher emissions.
The inclusion of a quadratic effect of GDP per capita on pollution is not so clear-cut.
The motivation is the "Kuznets curve", named after Simon Kuznets, who in a 1995 paper showed that income inequality rises for lower economic development and decreases for higher economic development. Grossman and Krueger (1993) were the first to present similar evidence, but considering pollution in place of income inequality.
The quadratic relationship between pollution and income per capita is now called the "Environmental Kuznets curve". Additionally, we take into consideration that the impact of growth on the environment can be separated in three channels: scale, technique and composition effect (see Copeland and Taylor, 2003) . The scale effect represents the impact on the environment due to greater economic activity. We take the GDP as a measure for this effect. The composition effect refers to changes in the mix of economic activity, for example, specialization in cleaner or dirtier goods. The capital to labor ratio is a usual proxy for the composition effect, and it is taken to reflect the production of dirty and clean goods, respectively. The problem with this measure is data availability. Therefore, we consider instead the value added of manufacturing as a percentage of the GDP. Finally, the technique effect concerns the use of a cleaner or dirtier technology. It is common in the literature to take GDP per capita as a proxy for this. We propose the inclusion of a more direct measure of this effect, which is the percentage of electricity production from "dirty" sources.
The 2000 Marland and Boden (2001) present more general statistics, which points out to the higher CO 2 emission rate of Coal and Petroleum Combustion. The reason for this is the ratio of Hydrogen to Carbon, which differs in each fuel. Taking, therefore, oil and coal as the fuels that most emit CO 2 per unit of energy; we used World Bank"s data on electricity production from different sources as a percentage from the total, and added the percentage originating from Coal and Petroleum. This is what we called "dirty" electricity, which is a measure of the technique effect.
Other control variables we consider are: the share of manufacturing exports, the share of manufacturing imports, trade openness and an multilateral institutional variable. The definition, sources and availability of the variables are provided in Appendix D. Finally, the variables GDP, trade openness, GDP per capita and M&As 8 are taken in their logarithmic form to correct for excessive skewness. In Appendix E we present the skewness measure of all relevant control variables and CO 2 emissions. When there was a gain in terms of reduction of skewness we considered the logarithmic form.
3c Empirical model
To test our hypotheses, we consider a Panel Data model, as described below:
where i is an index for country and t for time. α i is a variable that captures unobserved heterogeneity for country i, and ε it is an error term.
Our dependent variable is Carbon Dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions (in log). We chose this variable for three main reasons. First, the data coverage of CO 2 emissions is available on an annual base from the World Bank for many countries, whereas other important air polluters, such as SO 2 and NO x have much more limited coverage. Second, some authors (see Hoffman et al., 2005, for an example) argue that Carbon Dioxide is a good proxy to measure pollution levels. Third, CO 2 is the major anthropogenic greenhouse gas causing global warming. It has, therefore, a global effect such as a rise in global temperatures. Other air pollutants (see Box 1) have a more local effect, such as acid rain and bad air quality. This distinction implies that their determinants could differ.
Box 1 Local air pollutants
Air pollutants emitted by local sources can bring local problems related to health and the environment. Given our hypotheses, we disaggregate our control variables (X it ) in four groups, as below:
where M it encompasses M&As from four sectors, separated by the development level of the acquirer country, leading to eight variables. M * it is the interaction of M it and the development status of the target country (1 if target is a High income economy, and 0 otherwise). Therefore, it also consists of eight variables. I it is the multilateral institutional variable. The final group, represented by C it , covers the remaining control variables.
The eight variables that form M it are individually represented by M k,j,i,t , where k = {A,C,P,Z) is an index for the target sector of the M&A (see Table 1 ) and j = {DC,LDC} stands for the development level of the acquirer country, either developed (DC) or least developed (LDC). Using this notation, 
We should interpret the result as follows: The reason for interacting the multilateral agreements with the development level of the target country is that richer countries are more likely to demand environment-friendly policy. Hence, we want to check whether a global agreement is less important for developed than developing countries in helping to reduce CO 2 emissions. Results
4a Main results
Our first estimation results consider the four sectors presented before, but it turned out that only variables of Pollution Intensive sector were significant. Therefore, we proceeded in steps to remove the non-significant sectors. Appendix F presents these initial results. Model 1 F considers all four sectors, 2 F removes the sector Construction and Services, 3 F removes additionally the Zero Pollution Intensive sector and 4 F also removes sector Agriculture and Mining. These sectors did not present a significant
result in all models we tested, therefore, apart from the results in Appendix F, we do not include them in the estimations we discuss here. Nonetheless, these findings confirm our Sector-specific impact hypothesis. Indeed, only M&As in manufacturing sectors with a positive intensity of pollution have an impact on CO 2 emissions.
Regarding the estimation procedure, we used a Hausman test to choose between a Random and a Fixed Effect Model. The traditional Hausman test produced a nonpositive definite differenced covariance matrix for all of the models tested. Hence, we considered instead the covariance matrix based on a common estimate of the disturbance matrix. This generated the sigmamore and sigmaless option. The former specifies that the covariance matrix uses the estimated disturbance variance from the random effect estimator; and the latter from the fixed effect estimator. For details on these options for the Hausman test, see the online help file of stata 9 , which additionally recommends the use of these options when comparing fixed-effects and random-effects models.
Our first results, presented in Appendix F, also show that a quadratic form for GDP per capita is not statistically significant. Hence, although we tested both specifications, we present in the next tables GDP per capita without the squared term, since only GDP per capita alone is statistically significant.
In Table 6 we present our main findings. Model 1 includes only GDP per capita as a proxy for the technique effect, whereas model 2 also considers dirty electricity. Model 3 considers both these variables, and it replaces GDP by total population as a measure for the scale effect. Overall we find that the scale and the composition effect are important in explaining CO 2 emissions. P,j,i,t +0.1) , with j = {DC,LDC}.
( Jorgenson, 2007) conclude that economic development (as measured by GDP per capita) is bad for the environment. Considering GDP the conclusion is reversed.
A significant part of pollution has its origin in the production side of the economy.
Therefore, the scale variable should not restrict to a measure of the demand side, such as Total Population. For this reason, we consider GDP as a better measure of the scale effect. Comparing Model 2 and 3, we prefer again number 2. Hence, we restrict the discussion of the results below to this Model.
We do not find evidence for the factor endowment hypothesis. Both exports of manufacturing as imports of manufacturing were not statistically significant. Trade openness instead was significant. The more open a developing country is the higher its CO 2 emissions. This is also the case for developed countries, but it is not as strong, as we can see by adding the coefficient of the interaction term.
For the three hypotheses from Section 1, our findings were as follow:
Empirical support for Multilateralism:
Multilateral agreements are an important instrument in reducing CO 2 emissions in both developed and developing countries.
The results for the institution variable shows that we have support for the Multilateralism hypothesis. The increase in participation in multilateral agreements leads to a reduction in CO 2 emissions. Each additional multilateral agreement that a country participates in decreases CO 2 emissions by 1.6%. Moreover, there is no significant difference between developed and developing countries.
Empirical finding for the Asymmetry hypothesis:
We did not find support for the Asymmetry hypothesis as stated in Section 1. Instead, we found another Asymmetry, with respect to the target sector of the M&As. Using the notation from section 3c, our Asymmetry findings can be grouped in two:
Pollution increases if target is from a least developed country
Our findings show that M&As to least developed countries increases CO 2 emissions in those countries. A 1% increase in M&As from Developed Countries to Least Developed
Countries in sector Positive-Intensity-Pollution implies an increase of 0.004% in CO 2 emissions. When the acquiring country is instead a Least Developing Country, the impact is stronger, of 0.006%.
Therefore, regardless of the acquiring country development status, firms that merge or acquire a firm from a least developed country contribute to CO 2 emissions in those countries. This finding suggests that acquiring firms tend to take advantage of the laxer environmental regulation of least developed countries. This could occur by adopting dirtier technologies, sending old technologies from the acquiring firm to the target firm, or by using the full capacity of production of the firm.
Pollution decreases if target is from a developed country
Our findings show that M&As to developed countries decreases CO 2 emissions in those countries. A 1% increase in M&As from Developed Countries to Developed Countries in sector Positive-Intensity-Pollution implies a decrease of 0.008% in CO 2 emissions.
When the acquiring country is instead a Least Developing Country, the impact is weaker, of 0.001%.
Again, the results have the same direction for both developed and least developed acquiring country. These results suggest that firms that merge or acquire a firm from a developed country have to adjust to their stricter environmental regulation. By doing that the multinational firm contributes to the decrease in CO 2 emissions in the target country. Nonetheless, we notice that this effect is stronger when the acquiring country is also from a developed country.
The empirical results for the Asymmetry hypothesis show that only part of our argument from section 2 holds. There we wrote about our expectations of a decrease in CO 2 emissions with M&As from developed countries. Nonetheless, this only takes place when the target country is a developed country. In other words, the destination country of the M&As is what matters, and not the origin. This makes sense once we take into account that most M&As do not result in new production plants, but they use instead the facilities of the target firm. Therefore, the "innovation offset" has to be substantial in order to motivate the firms to adopt cleaner technologies. When this innovation offset is not present, as in least developed countries, the acquiring firm actually takes advantage of the laxer regulation and pollutes more.
Hence, the Asymmetry hypothesis from Section 1 should be re-written as:
Hypothesis 1A: Target Country Asymmetry (i) M&As to a high income country (target country) reduce CO 2 emissions.
(ii) M&As to a low or middle income country (target country) increase CO 2 emissions.
Support for the Sector-Specific hypothesis: Only M&As on Pollution Intensive sectors affect pollution levels
As we pointed out in the beginning of this Section, our findings show that only M&As in manufacturing sectors with a strictly positive intensity of pollution have an effect on the pollution levels of the target country. Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Service and Manufacturing Sectors with an intensity of pollution equal to zero, have no effect.
These sectors represent approximately 70% of all M&As observed between 1988-2004 (see Table 5 ).
4b
Robustness check
Five sector disaggregation
In the main results the disaggregation of manufacturing sectors considered as polluting any manufacturing sector with a positive intensity of pollution, even if this index was very low. As a robustness check we test for a possible difference between polluting sectors with respect to the impact on CO 2 emissions. For that, we disaggregate manufacturing sectors in three sectors according to their pollution intensity. Table 7 describes this disaggregation (see Appendix A for details). Regarding the Multilateralism hypothesis, there is no reason for the results to change with a further disaggregation of the data. Indeed, the hypothesis is supported by these robustness results. (M k,j,i,t The Sector-specific impact hypothesis is also supported by the results. Now we have further support that sectors with a positive intensity of pollution are the only relevant sectors in analyzing the impact of M&As on CO 2 emissions. This is the case for Medium and High Pollution Intensive, showing that further disaggregation of the data does not add much to the analysis.
Finally, we find support for the Target Country Asymmetry Hypothesis. For both Medium and High Pollution Intensive sectors, we find that: (i) M&As to low or middle income countries increases CO 2 emissions in those countries, regardless of the acquiring country; (ii) M&As to high income countries decreases CO 2 emissions in those countries, regardless of the acquiring country.
Conclusion
This paper looks into the impact of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and In particular, our findings suggest that least developed countries should be the ones more concerned by the increase in pollution that M&As could bring to their countries.
Acquiring firms, from both developed and developing countries, take advantage of the laxer environmental regulation in those countries, and pollute more. We found robust evidence of an Asymmetry with respect to the Target countries. Table 9 summarizes these results. Table 9 show that if a target country has a lax environmental regulation, as in least developed countries, the outcome of M&As (in polluting sectors) will be an increase in pollution. On the other hand, developed countries, with their stricter environmental regulation offer an innovation offset for firms to become cleaner. Acquiring firms, regardless of the development level of their country will contribute to a decrease in the pollution if the target is from a developed country. This finding suggests that not only multilateral agreements are important, but local regulation and enforcement are the ultimate objective of these agreements.
classified as Medium Pollution Intensive.
Furthermore, we used this classification for all target countries. For that we assumed that the same sectors are high/medium/zero pollution intensive in the United States (source of data from the IPPS) and all other countries. This assumption is common in the literature (e.g. Eskeland and Harrison, 1997) , and it rests on the fact that proportionally the pollution intensity among the sectors within a country is the same.
Therefore, it still allows countries to be more or less environmental friendly. Although in practice these indices would differ per country, it is quite acceptable that some sectors are the most polluting sectors everywhere (such as petroleum refining and primary metal industries). Similarly for Zero Pollution Intensive, we expect that textile manufacturing, for example, will have one of the lowest intensity of pollution in every country.
Appendix B: Construction of variable "institution"
We created a variable that captures the institutional level of 155 countries of the world with respect to the environment. We considered data from the Earth Trends, World
Resources Institute 11 , which provides data on the year of ratification of 10 major multilateral agreements. With this information, we constructed a new dataset with the number of agreements ratified by each country from 1988 until 2005. This gave us an index from 0 (no agreements ratified) until 10 (all major agreements ratified) for each country between 1988-2005. The advantage of this dataset is twofold. First, it comprises a wide range of countries and years. Second, we include in one index, the participation or not in 10 major multilateral agreements. This dataset is available upon request. 
Appendix C: Additional data description

C1 Missing values by target and acquirer countries
In the main text we showed that the existence of the value of M&As is random in regard sectors and years of the deals. Nonetheless, one potential concern is that some countries appear to have more missing data than other. Figure C1 below plots the percentage of missing value for each country, when in the position of target, and Figure One thing that immediately stands out when comparing the missing value for countries in the position of target and acquirer is that these values are very similar for every country. In other words, countries that have more missing value when in the position of acquirer also have more missing value when in the position of target. To check for the validity of this statement, we computed the correlation between the percentage of missing value for target and acquirer countries. Considering only countries which had more than 10 M&As (both as target and as acquirer) for the whole period, the correlation was of 0.57; and taking instead only countries which had more than 100
M&As, the correlation was of striking 0.9. Finally, grouping the countries by their income classification, developing countries (either as target or as acquirer) have relatively less missing data, although this difference is not so substantial, especially when we compare them in the position of target. This is what Table C3 shows. (metric tons) 1.2*10 8 7.6*10 6 4.93*10 8 8.6 0.0 Population 2.9 * 10 7 5.3 * 10 6 1.1 * 10 8 8.7 -0.2 GDP 1.6*10 11 7.6*10 9 7.5*10 11 9.5 0. The decision of taking the independent and dependent variables in their natural or logarithmic form was based on their skewness measure. For that we analyzed basic statistics of the variables, as well as a visual comparison of the variables histograms when using its natural and logarithmic form. Table E1 presents the descriptive statistics, and Figure E1 gives the histogram for the relevant variables. Figure E1 -Selected variableshistograms; Graphs on the left show variables in natural units; Graphs on the right show variables in logarithm.
